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Washington and New Delhi used to have one of the most flourishing strategic partnerships in the post–Cold War period. The golden two decades, however, now appear to be in jeopardy as the two nations lose trust in one another, with tariffs threatening to push India closer to Washington’s rivals.

Evan Feigenbaum, a South Asia expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, offered a blunt assessment. “We’re in a situation in the U.S.-India relationship where the premises and assumptions of the last 25 years — that everybody worked very hard to build, including the president in his first term — have just come completely unraveled. The trust is gone,” he said.

The crisis in ties deepened after President Donald Trump this year announced tariffs on Indian imports in a bid to stop New Delhi from continuing to buy Russian crude oil despite its war in Ukraine. The levy was introduced in May at 25 percent, with the expectation of doubling to 50 percent on August 27. Instead of pushing India to change its procurement patterns, Trump’s move may have had the opposite effect. In recent weeks, India’s national security adviser has visited Moscow, Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar met his Russian counterpart, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held talks in New Delhi. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is also set to visit China for the first time in over seven years, and Russian President Vladimir Putin is expected to host him in Moscow before the end of the year. Even some in the U.S. are expressing surprise at the closeness in ties, and analysts say the tilt is not simply for show.

Hardened by what they see as U.S. attempts to meddle in their sovereignty, Indians are also likely to take exception. “They’re signaling very clearly that they view that as interference in India’s foreign policy, and they are not going to put up with it,” Feigenbaum said. “The public discourse is hardening.”

Hesitant at first, state-run refiners have continued to import Russian oil as the Kremlin offered discounts of between six and seven percent. Russian oil currently makes up 35 percent of Indian crude imports, up from just 0.2 percent before the Ukraine war. But Russia has moved to offer even more, with Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov saying that it will continue to ship “crude, oil products, thermal and coking coal,” while there is “potential for the export of Russian LNG.”

More than Trump

Michael Kugelman, a South Asia analyst based in Washington, said the Trump administration’s tariff decision was only one reason. “We’ve seen indications for almost a year of India wanting to ease tensions with China and strengthen relations, mainly for economic reasons. But the Trump administration’s policies have made India want to move even more quickly,” he said.

Some of New Delhi’s moves “are performative, but some will have a more lasting impact,” Feigenbaum argued. The strategic drift with the U.S. is seen by some as a calculated move on Modi’s part to project strength at home. India has reduced its dependence on Russian weapons in recent years, with greater procurement of U.S., French, and Israeli systems. With the war in Ukraine, however, energy trade with Moscow has increased significantly. Kugelman said that this proved the point “that the U.S. can’t be trusted, whereas Russia can — because Russia is always going to be there for India no matter what.”

For Modi, the turn toward Russia also helps at home, where he has maintained an emphasis on his leadership and safeguarding the livelihoods of farmers, small businesses, and young workers. A key reason New Delhi balked at giving in on some of Washington’s demands was that it had already done so much, Kugelman said. “India made concessions on tariffs on a host of different products, and bending to pressure on some of the labor demands — the U.S. wants India to take back workers who went home during the pandemic, for instance — India’s already done it. Because of those concessions, India needs to be careful about signaling further willingness to bend. This is one reason there was no trade deal — Modi put his foot down,” he said.

Indian energy secretary Indrapramit Bhattacharya went as far as saying that India’s energy trade with Russia was at the core of its foreign policy, to which Kugelman added, “I wouldn’t go that far, but the energy purchases are being equated with foreign policy support for Russia.” In Washington, some have become frustrated with the new energy ties. Former White House trade adviser Peter Navarro published an op-ed in the Financial Times on August 4 denouncing India’s Russian oil purchases as “opportunistic” and “deeply corrosive.” Navarro argued that U.S. tariffs were required to target India “where it hurts — its access to U.S. markets — even as it seeks to cut off the financial lifeline it has extended to Russia’s war effort.”

A turning point

While New Delhi and Washington have had their ups and downs, few were surprised by the announcement of the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal in 2008. It recognized India as a responsible steward of nuclear materials, allowing it to import fuel and technology from the U.S. without signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT. Washington and New Delhi were both mature enough at the time to “compartmentalize” where they disagreed, as Kugelman put it.

In 2022, as the two nations trade barbs, that approach may be harder. The U.S. has long viewed India as a key democratic foil to China as part of the Indo-Pacific strategy that has persisted across the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. But this defense, intelligence, and even energy trade spillover threatens the very bedrock of that policy.